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Multinational corporations (MNCs) are known for 
their huge investments in research and development 
activity. They are also known for superior patents, 
trade secrets, brand names, management techniques 
and marketing strategies. The provision of incentives 
(i.e., tax incentives and/or subsidies) and the adoption 
of FDI-stimulating policies stem from the 
expectationsthat FDI bringsenormous benefits such as 
the transfer of new technology.Numerous empirical 
studies have demonstrated FDI has a positive impact on 
economic growth of the host countries.However, it 
should be noted that the distribution of FDI across 
countries is not uniformwith some countries receive 
more FDI than the others. This observation raises the 
question of whether it is possible to identify a set of 
policies that might enhance the attractiveness of host 
countries as destinations for MNCs. 
In the investigation of factors that influence FDI 
flows, existing studies have mainly focussed on the 
traditional factors such as market size, trade openness, 
infrastructure and human capital. The role of other 
factors such as the quality of institution in the host 
country was largely ignored.Institution can be defined 
as the humanly devised constraints or rules of the game 
that structure political, economic, and social 
interaction. Institutions provide the incentive structure 
of an economy. Specifically, it affects security of 
property rights, prevalence of corruption, distorted or 
extractive policies, and thereby affects the incentive to 
invest in human and physical capital, and hence 
economic growth.The role of institutional quality in the 
development process has been extensively examined 
and economists have reached a consensus on the 
importance of good domestic institutions in explaining 
cross-country differences in both growth rates and 
income per capita. 
Following recent literature that emphasize on the 
importance of institution, this paper examines whether 
domestic institutional quality has any important role in 
attracting FDI. Instead of investigating the direct effect 
of institution on growth, this paper focuses on the 
indirect effect that institution may bring via FDI 
inflows. Arguably, countries with better institutional 
quality should be able to attract more investment 
because it improves productivity prospect, reduces the 
cost of doing business and uncertainty. In order to test 
the hypothesis, data from 77 countries over the 1981-
2005 period is utilised. Methodologically, this paper 
uses a system generalised method-of-moment panel 
estimator to address some of the weaknesses 
encountered in the previous literature on FDI-
institution link. Specifically, this estimator is able to 
formally address biases induced by the inclusion of 
lagged dependent variable, country-specific effects and 
endogeneity problem. 
There are several important conclusions emerge 
from this analysis. First, institution appears to be 
important determinant of FDI inflows. This finding is 
line with the view that improvements in the quality of 
domestic institution will reduce the cost of doing 
business, reduce uncertainty, and improve productivity 
prospect. This will eventually lead to more investments. 
Second, FDI is also seeking human capital and trade 
openness. The availability of quality workforce in the 
host countries is an important pre-condition for the 
successful operations of MNCs as they need people who 
are able to understand and work with new 
technology.Trade openness is important because most 
FDI is export oriented in nature such that MNC will 
invest in countries that pursue trade-promotion 
policies. In addition, MNCs investment decision also 
depends on the amount of existing FDI invested in the 
countries. This is consistent with the view that the 
success of MNCs in the host countries is an important 
signal for further investments by MNCs.Finally,FDI is 
not influenced by market size and infrastructurequality. 
This is not surprising and in fact consistent with recent 
literature. 
Importantly, the finding on the important role 
played by domestic institution in attracting FDI is 
robust and is not driven by outlier observations, or 
problems caused by weak instruments and simultaneity 
bias.   
 
Keywords:Foreign direct investment, Institutions, 
Generalised method-of-moment, Panel data, FDI 
determinants. 
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Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational 
corporations (MNCs) is considered as one of the key 
ingredients in the development process for many 
countries. MNCs have been linked to superior 
technologies, patents, trade secrets, brand names, 
management techniques and marketing strategies 
(Dunning, 1993). Also, they are known to be among the 
biggest spenders in research and development (R&D) 
activities (Borensztein et al., 1998). Moreover, they hire 
a large number of technical and professional workers 
(Markusen, 1995) and undertake substantial efforts in 
the education of workers (Fosfuriet al., 2001). Once 
they have invested and set up a subsidiary in host 
country, some of the advantages linked to MNCs may 
not be completely internalized and thus spill over to 
domestic firms, leading to the expansion of the 
domestic economy.1,2 
Based on the above-mentioned potential 
externalities, many countries have lifted a lot of 
restrictions imposed on FDI flows. For instance, an 
annual average of 175 changes in FDI laws was made 
during 2000-2008 period. Of these changes, 88 per cent 
were made favourable to FDI (UNCTAD, 2009). As a 
result of these efforts, FDI inflows rose sharply in the 
past few decades. According to UNCTAD (2001, 
2009), global FDI inflows rose from $57 billion in 1982 
to $1271 billion in 2000 and reached a record high of 
$2099 billion in 2007. In fact, over the past few decades 
the growth rate of world FDIs has exceeded the growth 
rates of both world trade and GDP. However, FDI 
inflows are not uniform across countries with few 
countries are able to attract more FDI than the others. 
In order to better understand the nature of FDI, 
several studies have examined the link between FDI 
and its determinants. Several factors have 
beenidentified as important for FDI inflows which 
includes market size(Ramirez, 2006; Quazi, 
2007),quality infrastructure (Asiedu, 2002), openness to 
trade (Ang, 2008; Fedderke and Romm, 2006), and 
human capital (Glass and Saggi, 2002, Noorbakhshet 
                                                           
1  Additionally, FDI is a useful source of capital for host 
countries to finance current account deficits. FDI is 
considered less volatile than other types of capital such as 
portfolio investment because MNCs investment strategy is 
long term in nature. However, few economists argue that FDI 
is detrimental (see review by Zilinske, 2010). 
2 Several studies reveal that FDI is growth-enhancing but 
many of them show that such effect exists only under certain 
conditions. See for example, Azman-Sainiet al., 2010a,b; 
Alfaro et al., 2004; Durham, 2004; Borenzsteinet al., 1998; 
among many others. 
al., 2001).3Although there is a plethora of research on 
the influence of the above-mentioned factors on FDI 
inflows, only a few studies have made serious attempt 
to investigate the link between institutional quality and 
FDI flows (e.g.Ali et al., 2010; Busse and Hefeker, 
2007).4There are at least three reasons to believe why 
the quality of domestic institutions serves as an 
important pre-condition for attracting more FDI 
inflows. First, good institutions raise productivity 
prospects and therefore may attract foreign investors. 
Second, poor institutional environment can increase the 
cost of doing business. For example, corruption may 
deter investment because it increases the cost of doing 
business(Wei, 2000).Third, FDI is vulnerable to 
uncertainty including uncertainty due to poor 
government efficiency because FDI involves high sunk 
cost. For instance, imperfect enforcement of contracts 
may increase uncertainty regarding future returns and 
therefore negatively affect investment. 
The aim of this study is to examine the role 
domestic institutional quality plays in determining FDI 
inflows while addressing some of the drawbacks in the 
recent empirical literature. This study is related to Ali et 
al. (2010) and Busse and Hefeker (2007) who also 
evaluate the impact of institutional quality on FDI 
inflows. Ali et al., (2010), who use fixed effect 
estimator, show that FDI inflows are significantly 
related to property rights in developing countries. 
Meanwhile, using difference generalised method of 
moment (GMM) estimators, Busse and Hefeker (2007) 
reveal that FDI inflows ispositively related to political 
risk indeveloping countries. One limitation of Ali et 
al’s (2010) work is that the authors did not address 
simultaneity bias. Intuitively, FDI and institution may 
be jointly determined as MNCs may demand for better 
institutional environment in host countries. Since most 
countries are competing for FDI, governments will be 
induced to improve the quality of domestic institutions. 
Busse and Hefeker (2007) address simultaneity bias in 
the FDI-institution relationship using difference GMM 
estimator. However, one problem remains. As Blundell 
and Bond (1998) show, inferences based on the 
difference GMM estimation is likely to be incorrect in 
the presence of persistent variable. This is particularly 
relevant for institution as it has a strong tendency to 
                                                           
3Blonigen (2005)provides an excellent survey of the literature 
on FDI determinants. Ali et al. (2010) provide a summary of 
the few studies on the institutional determinants of FDI. 
4 North (1990) defines institution as the humanly devised 
constraints or rules of the game that structure political, 
economic, and social interaction. The role of institutional 
quality in the development process has been extensively 
examined and economists have reached a consensus on the 
importance of good domestic institutions in explaining cross-
country differences in both growth rates and income per 
capita (see Acemogluet al., 2005, for a recent survey). 
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persist once it becomes established in society 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). In this paper, we 
employ a system GMM estimator which is not only 
able to address simultaneity bias but also problems 
associated with difference GMM estimation when it 
comes to analysing persistent 
variable.Additionally,both developed and developing 
countries are included in our sample. The inclusion of 
developed countries in the analysis of FDI is 
undeniably important given the fact that most of FDI 
flows across developed countries. Also, we assess the 
impact of outlier observations on the estimation 
results,in search of a robust relationship between FDI 
and institution. The importance of addressing outliers in 
the analysis of FDI has been emphasised by Azman-
Sainiet al. (2010b) who show that the failure to 
properly address outlier observations may lead to 
incorrect conclusions. The results of our study will 
complement, or alter, the conclusions documented in 
previous studies particularly by Ali et al. (2010) and 
Busse and Hefeker, (2007). 
 
Model Specification 
In this study, we employ aspecification which is 
broadly similar to others (e.g. Ali et al., 2010, Quazi, 
2007). The impact of institutional quality and other 
variables on FDI inflows is expressed as follows: 
FDI, = αFDI,	 + α	INS,+αX, + η + ε, (1) 
whereiis country index, t is time index. The dependent 
variable, FDI, is net FDI inflows expressed as a ratio to 
GDP, INS is a measure of institutional quality, X is a 
vector of control variables which are hypothesized to 
affect FDI inflows, iη  is unobserved country-specific 
effect term, and itε  is a white noise error term. The 
choice of control variables is guided by previous 
literature. It encompasses variables that are frequently 
included in the analysis of FDI determinants including 
population size (a proxy for market size), telephone line 
(a proxy for infrastructure development), trade/GDP 
ratio (a proxy for trade openness), and life expectancy 
(a proxy for human capital).With this specification, if 
the estimated coefficient on INS is positive and 
significant, this would imply that INS is an important 
determinant for MNC locational choice. In other words, 
higher level of institutional development will attract 
more FDI inflows. 
Methodology 
This study employs a system generalized-method-
of-moment (GMM) panel estimator which was first 
developed by Holtz-Eakinet al. (1988). The estimator 
was then extended and improved by Arellanoand Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and 
Bond (1998). The choice of this estimator over other 
alternatives because it has several advantages compared 
to other alternatives. First, this estimator is able to 
control for the presence of unobserved country-specific 
effects. Second, it is also able to control for a 
simultaneity bias caused by the potential endogeneity of 
the explanatory variables.  
There are two variants of GMM estimator namely, 
difference-GMM (D-GMM) and system GMM (S-
GMM). The D-GMM estimator is based on the first-
difference transformation of Equation (1) to eliminate 
country-specific effects as follows: 
 
FDI, − FDI,	 = αFDI,	 − FDI,+β	INS, −
INS,	+βX, − X,	 + (ε, − ε,	 (2) 
In order to eliminate bias induced by the 
endogeneity of the explanatory variable as well as the 
correlation between FDI,	 − FDI,  and (ε, −
ε,	 , Arellano and Bond (1991)suggested 
usinghigher-order lags of regressors as instruments. 
Under this strategy, two assumptions must be fulfilled 
for instruments to be valid. First, the error terms in 
Equation (2) must not (second-order) serially correlated 
and secondly, the lag of the explanatory variables are 
weakly exogenous. Following Arellano and Bond 
(1991),the moment conditions for Equation (2) are set 
as below: 
EFDI, ∙ ε, − ε,	 = 0	for	s ≥ 2; t = 3,… , T(3) 
EINS, ∙ ε, − ε,	 = 0	for	s ≥ 2; t = 3,… , T(4) 
EX, ∙ ε, − ε,	 = 0	for	s ≥ 2; t = 3,… , T(5) 
This type of econometric strategy was used by 
Busse and Hefeker(2007) in evaluating the institutional 
impact on FDI inflows. However, it should be noted 
that although the above strategy is able to control for 
biases caused by country-specific effects and the 
endogeneity of explanatory variables, it has one serious 
limitation. Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the instrumental 
variables (i.e. lagged levels of the explanatory 
variables) are weak if the explanatory variables are 
persistent. They show that this problem could lead to 
biased parameter estimates in small samples and larger 
variance asymptotically.In the present context, this 
should be properly addressed as institution is highly 
persistent and move slowly over time (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2008).To overcome this problem, Arellano 
and Bover (1995) propose S-GMM estimator that 
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combines Equations (1) and (2). Blundell and Bond 
(1998) reveal that the S-GMM estimator is able to 
reduce biases and imprecision associated with D-GMM 
estimator. Following Arellano and Bover (1995), the 
moment conditions set for Equation (2) are the same as 
above and the additional moment conditions for 
Equation (1) are set as follows: 
&'(),*+−&'(),*+	 ∙ ,) + -),* = 0	./01 = 1; t = 3,… , T
    (6) 
(34),*+−(34),*+	 ∙ ,) + -),* = 0	./01 = 1; t = 3,… , T
    (7) 
5),*+−5),*+	 ∙ ,) + -),* = 0	./01 = 1; t = 3,… , T 
    (8) 
The validity of assumption on both error term and 
instruments determine the overall consistency of the 
GMM estimator. Thus, two specification tests are 
needed to examine the validity. The first is the Hansen 
test of over-identifying restrictions with the null 
hypothesis of the validity of the instruments. The 
second test examines the hypothesis of no second-order 
serial correlation in the differenced error term (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). If the null of both tests cannot be 
rejected, this would indicate that the model is 
adequately specified and the instruments are valid. 
The GMM estimators are typically applied in one- 
and two-step variants (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The 
one-step estimators use weighting matrices that are 
independent of estimated parameters, while the two-
step counterpart utilizes the so-called optimal weighting 
matrices in which the moment conditions are weighted 
by a consistent covariance matrix estimate.This 
adjustment makes the two-step estimator asymptotically 
more efficient than the one-step estimator. However, 
the application of the two-step estimator to a small 
sample, as in our case, may lead to several problems. 
These problems are induced by the instruments 
proliferation.Windmeijer (2005)shows that numerous 
instruments can lead to biased standard errors as well as 
parameter estimates in the two-step GMM estimation. 
Moreover, Bowsher (2002) shows that numerous 
instruments may result in unreliable over-identification 
test.The author reveals that that the test is undersized 
and never rejects the null of joint validity at 0.05 or 
0.10, rather than rejecting it 5% or 10% of the time as a 
well-sized test would. In a recent paper, Roodman 
(2009b) propose an innovative way of alleviating 
problems induced by the proliferation of instruments. 
Specifically, the author recommends reducing the 
dimensionality of the instrumental variable matrix. 
Consequently, this paper uses the moment 
conditions presented in Eqs. (3)–(8) and employs the 
two-step estimator. Following the suggestion 
byRoodman (2009b), we reduce the dimensionality of 
the instrumental variable matrix.5 
 
Data Description 
 
The data set consists of panel observations from 77 
countries (both developed and developing) for the 1981 
– 2005 period.6 The countries are selected based on the 
availability of reliable data over the sample period. In 
this paper, the key variables are FDI and institutional 
quality. FDI data is obtained from WDI and measured 
in term of FDI inflows over GDP (denoted FDI/GDP). 
The flows data is used rather than stock because data on 
FDI stock are not available for a large number of 
countries. Moreover, the FDI stock is expressed in term 
of book values without any adjustment for inflations 
and exchange rates variation. The inflow data are less 
vulnerable to “book value bias” (Root and Ahmed, 
1979). The data set on five institutional quality 
indicators are taken from International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). These five indicators are (i) bureaucratic 
quality, (ii) rule of law, (iii) corruption, (iv) risk of 
expropriation, and (v) government repudiation of 
contracts. The first indicator is scaled from 0 to 4, the 
second and third indicators are scaled from 0 to 6, and 
the last two indicators are scaled from 0 to 10. For all 
indicators, the value of zero indicates the lowest level 
of institutional quality and vice-versa. To ensure 
comparability, all data are converted into 0-10 scale. 
Then, the aggregate index of institutional quality is 
obtained by summing up the values for each indicator. 
Thus, a country with perfect institutional quality will 
have a value of 50. 
Other control variables used are trade ratio (import 
plus export/GDP), life expectancy, population, and 
infrastructure. Trade ratio and life expectancy are 
intended to measure trade openness and human capital, 
respectively. Both data were taken from WDI. 
Population was taken from the PWT database. Finally, 
telephone line (measured as per 100 people) is used to 
measure the level of infrastructure development. The 
data were extracted from WDI database.  
This study uses panel data. By utilizing 
information on both the intertemporal dynamics and the 
individuality of the insurance market, the efficiency of 
econometric results are greatly improved. However, the 
use of time series dimension introduces one problem. A 
glance at the data reveals that FDI inflows are highly 
volatile and some observations are missing. The large 
fluctuations in FDI may obscure the effects of 
institutional quality and other determinants on FDI 
                                                           
5
All estimations were performed using the xtabond2 routine 
developed by Roodman (2009a). 
6Refer Appendix A for country list. 
  
5 
 
inflows. To address this problem, this study uses panels 
based on five-year averages (1981-1985, 1986-1990, 
…, 2001-2005). In so doing, we are also able to 
eliminate the business cycle effect. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the 
key variables namely, FDI and institution quality index. 
Statistics are based on data averaged over the 1981-
2005 period. One apparent feature of these statistics is 
that there is considerable variation in the data. The 
share of FDI in GDP ranges from 0.07% in Japan to 
6.5% in Guyana. The institutional quality index ranges 
from 17.9 (Mali) to 44.7 (Finland). 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDI/GDP 1.95 1.32 0.07 6.53 
Institution 29.98 7.63 17.90 44.75 
 
As a preliminary check, we plot the data for all of 
the FDI determinants. Figure 1 displays the 
relationships for 77 countries using data averaged over 
the entire period. The figure shows that trade, telephone 
line, life expectancy and institutional quality indicators 
show positive relationships with FDI. In contrast, the 
relationship between FDI and population appear to be 
negative. In all cases the correlation coefficients are 
relatively low,ranging from 0.02 (telephone line) to 
0.232 (trade). However, this simple correlation does not 
imply causation which is precisely the type of relation 
that we are interested in. It is also worth mentioning 
that the figure also highlight that Kuwait and Japan fall 
relatively far from the others which indicate that they 
are potential outliers.  
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Figure 1.Scatter plot of FDI versus its Determinants 
 
The next exercise is to evaluate the importance of 
domestic institutional quality in determining FDI 
inflows. A proxy for institutional quality complied from 
ICRG is used and result is reported in Table 2. The 
result shows that most of the FDI determinants appear 
to be statistically significant at the 10% level or better, 
except for population and telephone line. More 
importantly, the results reveal the importance of 
institutionalquality in attracting FDI inflows. 
Specifically, the result indicates that a 1 percentage-
point increase in the institutional quality would lead to 
0.015 percentage-point higher FDI/GDP inflows. This 
indicates “good” institutions are able to attract more 
FDI inflows because it makes the business and 
investment environment more conducive for MNCs to 
operate. Regarding other FDI determinants, the 
coefficient on lagged FDI is positive and statistically 
significant which indicates that the past value of FDI is 
an important determinant for current FDI. This is 
consistent with the argument that MNCs are much more 
likely attracted to countries that already have 
accumulated sizable FDI. This clearly indicates that the 
success of MNC in the host countries is a strong 
attracting factor for further investments by foreign 
companies. The outcome for life expectancy (i.e. proxy 
for human) is not a surprise, and in fact, is consistent 
with many previous works such as Noorbakhshet al. 
(2001)who also find the importance of human capital in 
attracting FDI inflows. It has been widely known that 
MNCs invest significantly in research and development 
activities to develop new technologies. Therefore, host 
country must have a certain level of human capital that 
is able to understand and work with new technology 
brought by MNCs. Meanwhile, the trade ratio viewed 
as a standard measure for openness in the literature 
implies that greater liberalization of trade sector plays 
an important role in attracting investment from MNCs, 
which is line with the findings of Chakrabarti (2001) 
andAng (2008). However, the coefficients on telephone 
line and population are statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels. This finding is not surprising and 
in fact consistent with Ali et al. (2010) who also find 
that FDI is not seeking market size and quality 
infrastructure. Since the p-values for Hansen 
overidentification test (0.393) and second order of serial 
correlation (0.258) are high, the null of both tests 
cannot be rejected. This provides support for the 
validity of our finding. 
 
Table 2 
FDI determinants 
Regressor Coeff. S.e. p-value 
(FDI/GDP)it-1 0.287 0.112 0.010      
Trade/GDP 0.018 0.006 0.003      
Telephone line -0.002 0.002 0.174     
Life expectancy 0.028 0.016 0.094     
Population -0.002 0.002 0.403     
Institution 0.015 0.007 0.055     
    
AR(2) test (p-value)  0.258  
J-test (p-value)  0.393  
Observations  304  
Countries  77  
Notes: S.e. indicates heteroskedasticity-robust standard error. 
AR(2) is testing second-order residual serial correlation. J-test 
is the Hansen test of overidentification. Time dummies are 
included to capture period-specific effect but not reported. All 
variables are in logarithmic form. 
 
In a recent study, Azman-Sainiet al. (2010b) show 
that it is critically important to evaluate the impact of 
outliers in the analysis of FDI. They show that the 
inclusion of China in their FDI-growth analysis appear 
to distort estimation results. It could be that the finding 
of a strongpositive institutional determinant of FDI may 
be driven by outlier observations. In order to verify that 
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the link between institution and FDI is robust to 
outliers, we formally identify the potential outliers by 
computing DFITS statistic, as suggested by Belsleyet 
al. (1980).The test identifies observations with high 
combination of leverage and residual and is calculated 
as )1/( jjjj hhrDFITS −= , where jr  is studentized 
residual given by  )1/( )( jjjj hser −=  with )( js  refer 
to the root mean squared error (s) of the regression 
equation with jth observation removed, and h is 
leverage statistic. Following Belsleyet al.(1980), an 
observation is considered as outlier if the absolute 
DFITS statistic is greater than nk /2 , where k 
denotes the number of explanatory variables and n the 
number of countries. The test reveals that Kuwait and 
Japan are true outliers.7Figure 2shows the combinations 
of leverage point and residual for all countries in our 
sample. Clearly, it shows that Japan and Kuwait have 
high combinations of residual and leverage and they fall 
relatively far from the rest of the other observations. 
 
Figure 2.Residual versus leverage  
The re-estimation result with the exclusion of 
Kuwait and Japan are reported in Table 3. Interestingly, 
the result shows that the importance of good institution 
as an attractor for FDI remain intact as the p-value for 
the coefficient on institution is less than the 10% level. 
Interestingly, the exclusion of outliers has slightly 
increased the magnitude of the impact of institutional 
development on FDI inflows. More importantly, the 
specification tests indicate that the model is adequately 
specified and the result is not driven by simultaneity 
bias. Therefore, our previous interpretation regarding 
the importance of promoting good intuitional 
development in attracting FDI inflows is unchanged. 
The link is robust and not driven by outlier 
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The DFITS tests are -1.1958 (Japan) and -1.3066 (Kuwait). 
The threshold level is 0.5096. 
observations. Our finding is consistent with Ali et al. 
(2010) and Busse and Hefeker (2007) who find the 
importance of property right protection and political 
stability as pre-conditions for MNCs presence. 
Table 3 
Excluding Outliers (Japan and Kuwait) 
Regressor Coeff. S.e. p-value 
(FDI/GDP)it-1 0.221 0.119 0.065     
Trade/GDP 0.021 0.006 0.002      
Telephone line -0.003 0.002 0.169     
Life expectancy 0.041 0.025 0.098     
Population -0.002 0.002 0.318     
Institution 0.016 0.008 0.070     
    
AR(2) test (p-value)  0.138  
J-test (p-value)  0.427  
Observations  296  
Countries  75  
Notes: S.e. indicates heteroskedasticity-robust standard error. 
AR(2) is testing second-order residual serial correlation. J-test 
is the Hansen test of overidentification. Time dummies are 
included to capture period-specific effect but not reported. All 
variables are in logarithmic form. 
Conclusions 
FDI is viewed as one of the important channel for 
the transfer of new knowledge across borders. As a 
result, many countries compete against each other to 
attract more FDI. In an effort to further understand the 
nature of FDI flows, this paper draws from recent 
literature that highlightsthe importance of institutions in 
the growth process.Specifically, it explores the role of 
institution in attracting FDI inflows. It argues that FDI 
is seeking quality domestic institutions because good 
institution is able to create betterenvironments for 
investors in terms of lower cost of doing business, 
lower uncertainty and higher productivity prospect.  
In order to test the hypothesis, this study uses 
generalized method-of-moment panel estimator and 
data from 77 countries over the 1981-2005 period. 
From the analysis which also includes other traditional 
FDI determinants, weuncover the following results: 
• Improvement in institutional quality is a critically 
important pre-condition for host countries to attract 
FDI. 
• Human capital, trade openness, and the existing 
stock of FDI are also important FDI determinants. 
• FDI inflows are not influenced by the market size 
and infrastructurequality. 
 
Importantly, these findingsare robust as they are 
not influenced by simultaneity bias, problem due to 
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weak instruments or the presence of outlier observations.  
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Summary 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are known for their huge investments in research and development activity. 
They are also known for superior patents, trade secrets, brand names, management techniques and marketing 
strategies. The provision of incentives (i.e., tax incentives and/or subsidies) and the adoption of FDI-stimulating 
policies stem from the expectationsthat FDI brings enormous benefits such as the transfer of new 
technology.Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated FDI has a positive impact on economic growth of the 
host countries.However, it should be noted that the distribution of FDI across countries is not uniform with some 
countries receive more FDI than the others. This observation raises the question of whether it is possible to identify 
a set of policies that might enhance the attractiveness of host countries as destinations for MNCs. 
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In the investigation of factors that influence FDI flows, existing studies have mainly focussed on the traditional 
factors such as market size, trade openness, infrastructure and human capital. The role of other factors such as the 
quality of institution in the host country was largely ignored.Institution can be defined as the humanly devised 
constraints or rules of the game that structure political, economic, and social interaction. Institutions provide the 
incentive structure of an economy. Specifically, it affects security of property rights, prevalence of corruption, 
distorted or extractive policies, and thereby affects the incentive to invest in human and physical capital, and hence 
economic growth.The role of institutional quality in the development process has been extensively examined and 
economists have reached a consensus on the importance of good domestic institutions in explaining cross-country 
differences in both growth rates and income per capita. 
Following recent literature that emphasize on the importance of institution, this paper examines whether 
domestic institutional quality has any important role in attracting FDI. Instead of investigating the direct effect of 
institution on growth, this paper focuses on the indirect effect that institution may bring via FDI inflows. Arguably, 
countries with better institutional quality should be able to attract more investment because it improves productivity 
prospect, reduces the cost of doing business and uncertainty. In order to test the hypothesis, data from 77 countries 
over the 1981-2005 period is utilised. Methodologically, this paper uses a system generalised method-of-moment 
panel estimator to address some of the weaknesses encountered in the previous literature on FDI-institution link. 
Specifically, this estimator is able to formally address biases induced by the inclusion of lagged dependent variable, 
country-specific effects and endogeneity problem. 
There are several important conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, institution appears to be important 
determinant of FDI inflows. This finding is line with the view that improvements in the quality of domestic institution 
will reduce the cost of doing business, reduce uncertainty, and improve productivity prospect. This will eventually 
lead to more investments. Second, FDI is also seeking human capital and trade openness. The availability of quality 
workforce in the host countries is an important pre-condition for the successful operations of MNCs as they need 
people who are able to understand and work with new technology.Trade openness is important because most FDI is 
export oriented in nature such that MNC will invest in countries that pursue trade-promotion policies. In addition, 
MNCs investment decision also depends on the amount of existing FDI invested in the countries. This is consistent 
with the view that the success of MNCs in the host countries is an important signal for further investments by MNCs. 
Finally, FDI is not influenced by market size and infrastructurequality. This is not surprising and in fact consistent 
with recent literature. 
Importantly, the finding on the important role played by domestic institution in attracting FDI is robust and is 
not driven by outlier observations, or problems caused by weak instruments and simultaneity bias.   
 
 
Appendix A. List of countries 
Country Code Country Code Country Code Country Code 
Algeria DZA France FRA Malawi MWI South Africa ZAF 
Argentina ARG Gambia, The GMB Malaysia MYS Spain ESP 
Australia AUS Ghana GHA Mali MLI Sri Lanka LKA 
Austria AUT Greece GRC Malta MLT Sweden SWE 
Bolivia BOL Guatemala GTM Mexico MEX Switzerland CHE 
Botswana BWA Guyana GUY Morocco MAR Thailand THA 
Brazil BRA Honduras HND Netherlands NLD Togo TGO 
Cameroon CMR Iceland ISL New Zealand NZL Trinidad &Tobago TTO 
Canada CAN India IND Nicaragua NIC Tunisia TUN 
Chile CHL Indonesia IDN Niger NER Turkey TUR 
China  CHN Iran IRN Norway NOR United Kingdom GBR 
Colombia COL Ireland IRL Pakistan PAK United States USA 
Costa Rica CRI Israel ISR Panama PAN Uruguay URY 
Cote d`Ivoire CIV Italy ITA Papua New Guinea PNG Venezuela VEN 
Denmark DNK Jamaica JAM Paraguay PRY Vietnam VNM 
Dominican Rep. DOM Japan JPN Peru PER Zambia ZMB 
Ecuador ECU Jordan JOR Philippines PHL Zimbabwe ZWE 
Egypt EGY Kenya KEN Portugal PRT   
El Salvador SLV Korea, Rep. KOR Saudi Arabia SAU   
Finland FIN Kuwait KWT Senegal SEN   
 
